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Through the example of Ciudadela Nuevo Occidente, a large social housing district in 
Medellín, this article describes a process that primarily involves co-learning and micro- 
negotiations that help produce the cognitive alignment necessary to the management of 
services. The hypothesis put forward in this article is that the frictions caused by the 
residents’ difficulties in adapting to the socio-economic, cultural and cognitive frameworks of 
their new environment, imposed by urban modernisation running processes, engender forms 
of service co-production that ultimately strengthen the utility’s capacity to extend and adapt 
its delivery model while enhancing the quality of services. 
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1. Introduction 
The processes of urban transformation underway in the city of Medellín since the 
early 2000s are driving changes in ways of life and necessary adjustments to 
urban management. Here, we examine the rehousing of populations – often from 
informal districts – in apartment buildings, exploring how it puts pressure on the 
provision of residential services, on the nature of the relations between providers 
and users, and the distribution of responsibilities in the day-to-day management 
of the service. 
Whereas the literature on networked services in cities of the South, especially 
in South America, has emphasised the challenges of supplying services in poor 
and informal – not to say illegal – neighbourhoods (Moretto 2010; Pilo’ 2015; 
Pírez 2013) and discussed at length the effects of privatisation and liberalisation 
reforms (Botton 2004, 2007; De Gouvello and Fournier 2002; López Rivera 
2013; Pírez 2000), this paper has a different point of view. It examines the role of 
residential services (water, sewerage, electricity and gas) in urban 
modernisation, highlighting their contribution to three processes of change: the 
formalisation of relations between residents and urban institutions; the extension 
of individual social benefits associated with homeownership in apartment 
buildings; and the integration of new groups of dwellers in the provision of 
residential services, thereby producing adjustments in their management. 
The notion of co-production of urban networked services in cities of the South 
is often associated with different forms of partnership between state and non-
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state actors like  CBOs and NGOs in contexts of fiscal constraints and/or weak 
public authorities (Allen 2013; Allen, Dávila, and Hofman 2006; Batley and 
Mcloughlin 2010; Jaglin 2005; Joshi and Moore 2004; Moretto 2014). Recently, it 
has also been associated with delivery of services by informal private providers 
(Ahlers et al. 2014). We argue that Medellin offers another configuration of the 
‘multiple facets of co-producing’ (Alford 2014) under the ‘classical interpretation 
of co-production as the involvement of individual citizens and groups in public 
service delivery’ (Verschuere, Brandsen, and Pestoff 2012, 1086). In the case of 
Ciudadela Nuevo Occidente (subsequently referred to as ‘Ciudadela’), a new 
social housing district for first-time buyers, the provision of residential services 
brings together residents, as direct consumers; their representatives in the 
condominiums (the building leaders); the municipal service operator, Empresas 
Públicas de Medellín (EPM); as well as the municipality (mainly through its social 
housing institute, ISVIMED). We use the concept of co-production to define this 
configuration, in which interactions between heterogeneous actors involved in 
the provision of service (Ostrom 1996) entail forms of coordination and 
processes of co-learning and micro-negotiations that help produce the cognitive 
alignment necessary to the management of services in social housing estates 
where EPM meets heterogenous public. 
The focus is on those processes of interactions that produce particular 
service modalities: we look at the ‘small’ arrangements that make the service 
work, including for those who, otherwise, would be excluded by formal rules. This 
is based on the premise that ‘the production of a service, as contrasted to a 
good, [is] difficult without  the active participation of those supposedly receiving 
the service’  (Ostrom  1996,  1079). Therefore, we understand co-production as 
‘an essential and inalienable core component of service delivery’ (Osborne and 
Strokosch 2013, S32), and we analyse   how it manifests in operational terms as 
a ‘consumer co-production’ according to Osborne and Strokosh’s typology  
(2013,  S37). Our approach combines three  levels of analysis. 
The first one focuses on the household and its living space, where residential 
services are a vehicle for the routinisation of ‘proper’ consumer’s practices 
associated with home-ownership and official connection to the municipal 
networks. The relationship with EPM (through individual subscription, metering 
and billing) is thus part of a ‘regularisation’ process (Pilo’ 2015) through which 
residents and the utility jointly contribute to the advent of a ‘modern’ city.  Co-
production appears here in the way households juggle with service delivery 
conditions, shifting exceptional commercial measures into daily and recurrent 
solutions in order to cope with formal service. 
The second level is the condominium. Co-production is in this case related to 
the distribution of responsibilities regarding fraud and payment of communal bills, 
leading to the gradual construction of a semiformal framework of collaboration 
between agents – residents, building leaders and service providers – who need 
to find shared collective rules, mechanisms of social control and methods of 
conflict settlement in the management of condominiums. 
At the third level, we examine how service delivery in Ciudadela is an 
outcome negotiated between EPM, local institutions and the new dwellers rather 
than one dominated by the utility alone. This shows that, although inhabitants of 
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social housing do not take part directly in the delivery of residential services, they 
contribute to it: their input is decisive to build trust and facilitate the process of 
cognitive alignment required for more efficient and affordable services. Even 
though inhabitants bear the greater part of the effort to adapt their behaviour and 
consumer practices, the service arrangements that really work result from a co-
construction with EPM and other institutional actors, whose compromises are also 
necessary. More than ‘technologies of government’ enacted through disciplinary 
and regulatory devices by EPM, the co-production of services then becomes an 
experimental method for stabilising and regulating the techno-commercial 
relationship established between the utility, local housing actors and residents 
both as individuals (households) and collectives (condominiums). 
The paper is divided into four parts. The first situates the Ciudadela district in 
relation to urban modernisation policies, the residential pathways of the 
households surveyed and the methods and theoretical framework of the 
argument. Each of the next three considers the arrangements for the co-
production of services at a different level: the household level, the apartment 
building level and the social housing district. The study’s main findings about the 
co-production of services in southern cities are summarised in the conclusion. 
 
2. Systems of co-production and urban modernisation 
Medellín attracts international attention because of the ‘urban transformation’ 
underway since the early 2000s. The municipal programmes of recent years1 
have applied a vision of the modern city based on planning urban development 
(control of urban sprawl, densification, regularisation of land ownership and 
economic activities, construction of amenities and public spaces. . .), restoring 
institutional presence in working-class neighbourhoods, involving the private 
sector in the making of the city and producing ‘decent’ living conditions for the 
whole population (education, health, housing, employment, transports, etc.). 
‘Sharing the benefits of development’ and correcting a ‘historical debt’ to the 
inhabitants of working-class districts abandoned by the State are at the heart of 
political discourses explaining urban policies. Since the term of office of Sergio 
Fajardo (2004–2007) and the implementation of a communication and urban 
marketing strategy around the ‘social urbanism model’, transformations 
combining competitive modernisation and inclusion have become more visible 
and have acquired significant international recognition.2 Physical transformation 
– through Proyectos Urbanos Integrales (PUI), the modernisation of transport 
infrastructures (Metrocables and Metroplus) and the construction of educational 
facilities – is to ‘achieve the urban integration of neighbourhoods and increase 
opportunities for those who live and work there’ (Dávila 2012, 12) and is 
recognised as a lever of social transformation (Brand 2013, 6). 
 
2.1. Co-production: collaborative learning for urban integration 
Strategic as it is, however, the material transformation of the built fabric alone is 
not enough to accomplish all the changes involved in the urban modernisation 
plan. Changes in urban ways of life, in the use of public space and in 
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consumption practices of services are equally important, and require the support 
of the city’s inhabitants. We focus here on inhabitants rehoused in an area of 
social housing condominiums. Since many come from precarious 
neighbourhoods where they had access to services (water, electricity) on a 
collective and informal basis, they face a steep learning curve on issues such as 
apartment life, formal homeownership and its consequences (in particular taxes 
and meters), the individualisation of commercial relations with the operator and 
the collective management of condominiums. But, even when the principle of 
payment and the disciplining mechanisms associated with a ‘modern’ urban life 
are not contested, a meter, a water tap or an electrical connection do not 
guarantee that users are able to manage the socio-technical chain that 
constitutes a properly operating service (Akrich 1998, 2010). In Medellin, as in 
many other southern cities, urban policies of modernisation targeting low- and 
middle-income neighbourhoods combine two components: the commodification 
of many urban goods and services that were previously free in informal 
settlements and the formalisation of citizenship. The implementation of this 
‘social compact’ through urban networked services has been well documented 
(Jaglin 2005, 2014; Luque-Ayala 2016; Pilo, 2015), and studies on Colombian 
utilities also emphasise how they combine reforms associated with neo-
liberalisation, extension of (water) supply and the modernisation pursued by 
urban policies (Acevedo Guerrero, Furlong, and Arias 2015; Furlong 2013; 
López Rivera 2013). Against this backdrop, we question how strategic policies 
are developed into workable actions by utilities in a social housing district in 
Medellin: we examine the material effects, places and modalities of EPM–dweller 
interactions, the content of their everyday negotiations to domesticate the 
conditions of service delivery, their results and limitations. 
We consider the activities of both dwellers, supported by political actors, and 
EPM’s and ISVIMED’s (municipal social housing institute) staff contributing to the 
provision of services in social condominiums to be a form of co-production that is 
an unstable and pragmatic process of collaboration between heterogeneous 
actors. At first sight, it follows the general definition provided by Ostrom: ‘By co-
production, I mean the process through which inputs used to produce a good or 
service are contributed by individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organization’ 
(1996, 1073). Under this definition, the notion covers the processes observed in 
Medellín but fails to describe them accurately and distinguish them from those 
found in other urban situations. 
In the South, the concept has multiple meanings and has been associated 
with different policies and objectives. In the 1970s and 1980s, the co-production 
of services was mainly associated with a substitutive principle in which 
government inputs were replaced by contributions in money and in kind from 
communities in poor neighbourhoods. From the 1990s onwards, in the wake of 
the so-called privatisation reforms, co-production was conceived more as a form 
of cost sharing between utilities and consumers, the last being considered as 
active asset-holders in the service relationship. More recently, it has been 
suggested ‘that informality in the water sector is best understood as a process of 
co- production’ (Ahlers et al. 2014, 5), while the formalisation of hybrid delivery 
configurations through micro-partnerships is the route taken by many African 
urban authorities to ‘regularise’ the informal economy of services (Jaglin 2016). 
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This background explains why the co-production of services is mainly 
documented in the context of urban regularisation of poor and insecure 
neighbourhoods (Baron and Bonnassieux 2013; Moretto 2010; Naulet, Gilquin, 
and Leyronas 2014). As a form of participatory engineering, it arises from a more 
general interest in the management of common-pool resources and services as 
well as in the conditions of emergence and consolidation of norms of cooperation 
between public operators and citizen organisations at a community scale 
(Ostrom 1996; Tendler 1997). Some studies highlight the political dimension of 
co- production (Mitlin 2008), or the spatial and political integration brought about 
by institutionalised co-production when it goes together with the recognition and 
regularisation of illegal neighbourhoods (Jaglin 2005; Moretto 2010, 2014), while 
others emphasise the ‘subversive’ power of co-production when it requires 
interactions which, far from being collaborative, are instead ‘tense and riddled 
with power asymmetries and political aspirations, thereby producing uneven and 
highly contested water service provisioning’ (Ahlers et al. 2014, 2). 
The processes we describe as co-production in Medellín are taking place in a 
significantly different context, since service supply is almost universal and 
provided by a conventional operator; social condominiums surveyed are formal, 
and the people live there with a legal status. Co-production is therefore neither 
about extending incomplete and failing public provision, nor developing a 
participatory way of jointly producing services, let alone sharing strategic 
decisions with users. Nevertheless, consumers receiving services from EPM 
need to incorporate new rules while the utility also needs to adapt to these new 
consumers: in that sense, co-production refers to a process having similarities 
with what, for instance, Jeannot defines as a co-produced service in France, in 
which users are involved in the definition of the ‘actual’ rules that govern the 
service daily (Jeannot 1998). It also bears similarities with what Verschuere et al. 
call co-management, ‘meaning that non-governmental actors have a say in the 
design of the service, or put time or other resources  (e.g. money, skills, 
expertise)  in  the delivery of public services’ (2012, 1086). In Medellin, it refers to 
a non-formalised (and non-institutionalised) cooperation between the residents 
and EPM, focusing on routine management operations (connection/ 
disconnection, metering of consumption, billing, aftersales service) relating to the 
provision of individual services (at household scale) and collective services (at 
the scale of social condominiums). It is therefore an example of ‘consumer co-
production’ (Osborne and Strokosch 2013), with a character that is ‘undefined, 
informal, and renegotiated almost continuously’ (Joshi and Moore 2004, 40), of 
which we scrutinise the retroactive learning effects both on household 
consumption practices and on EPM’s operations, thereby adapting the service 
delivery scheme through modest adjustments. 
The hypothesis put forward in this article is that the frictions caused by the 
residents’ difficulty in adapting to the socio-economic, cultural and cognitive 
frameworks that constitute the urban modernisation project engender forms of 
service co-production that ultimately strengthen the utility’s capacity to extend 
and adapt its delivery model while enhancing the quality of services, which is one 
outcome identified in the literature (Duque Gómez 2015; Verschuere, Brandsen, 
and Pestoff 2012). However, our surveys do not show other expected outcomes 
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often outlined in literatures situating ‘co-production as a normative alternative to 
prevailing funding or structural models used to deliver public service’ (Osborne 
and Strokosch 2013, S33). In the social condominiums surveyed, co- production 
is neither something claimed by the residents nor sought by the operator; it is 
rather a pragmatic outcome of learning to negotiate the sharp edges of a mutual 
adaptation. Transforming the model of supply and placing the inhabitants at the 
heart of a more democratic decision-making process are not expressed in 
explicit requests. As in other cities of the South (Criqui 2015; Pilo’ 2015), 
households’ consent to EPM model is primarily an expression of their will to 
participate in a threefold movement: of formalisation (of residential statuses and 
modes of access to services), of extension of individual social benefits 
associated with homeownership and of urban integration through the 
regularisation of service delivery (Jaglin 2016). Co-production is thus driven by a 
mutual desire for the gradual establishment of rules that maintain long-term 
service delivery in a context where the users and the provider do not, in principle, 
share the same technical culture or the same representations of urban 
‘modernity’. 
Under this definition, the co-production of services fits within a particular 
temporal scheme: associated with regularisation processes, it tends to not only 
regress to ‘lighter’ forms as inhabitants get used to the urban norm of modernity, 
but also re-emerge in the event of sudden changes in services (new technical 
systems, change of operator, institutional reforms…) or in the conditions of 
residents (rehousing, impoverishment…). The formal and norm-based framework 
of service supply in Ciudadela requires a two-way domestication process that is 
neither smooth nor instantaneous, and co-production sup- ports this transition: it 
is neither an end in itself nor an idealised issue of participation or 
‘empowerment’. Its purpose is collaborative learning and the marginal 
adjustment of shared and acceptable rules for the day-to-day management of 
services in social condominiums. Coupled with and subordinate to the urban 
modernisation project, the purpose of co-production is less to promote 
participatory democracy than to boost the effectiveness of public services and 
facilitate the urban integration of a heterogeneous citizenry. 
 
2.2. Ciudadela Nuevo Occidente: our fieldwork location 
The construction of Ciudadela Nuevo Occidente goes back to the early 2000s, 
with the Plan Parcial Pajarito project (2002, reviewed in 2012), which plans the 
development of one of the last remaining areas of unbuilt land on the northwest 
side of Medellín. This former rural area was earmarked for social housing in 
order to remedy a significant housing shortage3 going back several decades 
and exacerbated by the need to rehouse some of the inhabitants of districts 
where urban and infrastructure projects had been carried out as part of the 
‘transformation’ of the city. This sector, built on the model of big apartment 
building estates for first-time buyers, is ultimately intended to house between 
110,000 and 150,000 people4 (Plan Parcial Pajarito, 2012). It accounts for a 
significant proportion of local housing policy implementations and of the national 
policy for ‘100,000 free homes’.5 The first dwellings were delivered in 2006, 
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and construction work is still in progress.6 This sector is divided into 18 sets of 
tower blocks (urbanizaciones), each containing between 42 and 86 apartments, 
generally seven floors in height. The residential services in these buildings are 
provided by the EPM, the municipal multi-utility firm (water, sewerage, 
electricity, gas and telecoms (through its subsidiary company UNE)) and the 
main service provider in the metropolitan region. It transfers to the municipality 
(its sole owner) at least 30% of its annual benefits, allocated to social 
investment programmes  (public amenities, educational and health programmes, 
etc.). Medellin’s mayor presides the company’s board and chooses the board’s 
members and the company’s CEO. 
The apartments, measuring 42–45 m2, are delivered with the necessary 
installations for all residential services: water, sewerage, gas, telephone and 
Internet. However, only water, sewerage and electricity connections are active 
when the apartment is delivered, with the connection costs being included in total 
construction costs. The gas installation is in place, but households have to pay 
the connection costs directly to the supplier (financed over 36 or 48 months) if 
they wish to activate the service. The same is true for telecommunications. In 
addition, the social housing blocks also receive bills for drinking water, sewerage 
and electricity services for consumption in the communal areas.7 
While the construction of this district represents a pragmatic response to 
housing shortage, it has multiple consequences for the households and 
institutions involved in its day-to-day management. For the former, the sense of 
security linked with homeownership is quickly counterbalanced by a sense of 
geographical exclusion and isolation, reinforced by the lack of amenities, shops 
and job opportunities. In response, many households have converted part of 
their apartments into moneymaking premises (workshop, mini market, 
hairdresser, bar, recycling material storage, etc.). This ‘informality’ is one of a 
series of learning processes through which households adjust income to 
expenditure in this new environment, their consumption practices and billing in 
‘modern’ dwellings, interactions with neighbours, in the quest for temporary or 
more lasting solutions. For the later, we could at least name two main 
consequences. The first one is having to manage an ex-centred8 and highly 
dense area, with important needs in terms of urban amenities (education, health, 
transports, economic activities, etc.) that were insufficiently taken into 
consideration by the urban project and its building schedule (not enough 
classrooms were ready on time, health facilities were constructed 8 years after 
the first apartments were delivered). The second one is having to face conflicts 
related to the transposition of the co-ownership legal frame to an inexperienced 
and not always consenting community. This has a direct impact on service 
delivery, as it will be developed further. 
There are two mechanisms by which households move to Ciudadela9: one is 
by rehousing after expropriation associated with an urban development operation 
(22% of the households interviewed) or a de-urbanisation of high-risk areas10 
(15% of the households interviewed); the other by allocation to housing benefit 
recipients who have signed up with family service funds (19% of the households 
interviewed) or as beneficiaries of local and national social programmes (44% of 
the households interviewed) for low-income households11 or households 
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classified as displaced by armed conflict. These different residential pathways 
have implications for the way  households  appropriate their homes and their 
new living environment: among the relocated populations, some have to face 
paying bills for residential services for the first time; almost all the inhabitants 
‘discover’ the constraints of apartment life (limited space, proximity of 
neighbours, impossibility of changing accommodation conditions) and the 
obligations associated with the status of owner and co-owner, which include 
paying the bills for the communal areas of the building. 
 
2.3. Study methodology 
In a city where access to services is almost universal according to local statistics 
(Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2013), and where service delivery is based on a 
highly stabilised commercial and legal model, the case of Ciudadela allows us to 
analyse how substantial changes on living conditions affect this apparent 
stability. The field study12 sought to identify and analyse the processes 
contributing to the different levels of adjustment needed to reconcile individual 
situations (material, financial, cognitive  and  cultural) with the objectives of the 
political modernisation project, for which service delivery plays an important role. 
To do this, we chose to observe the difficulties, tensions and conflicts 
encountered by households in their use of residential services after settlement in 
a social housing apartment, with attention to three levels: the domestic residential 
unit, the condominium, the service operator EPM. 
The household surveys required a particular approach.13 Contact was first 
established with activist community leaders working to draw the authorities’ 
attention to the situation in Ciudadela. They enabled us to attend internal 
meetings among building leaders, meetings with institutional representatives and 
a variety of meetings between inhabitants. These meetings were essential to 
understanding the problems facing the inhabitants and institutions, and to 
observing some of the processes adopted to try to develop appropriate solutions. 
Semi-directive interviews with building leaders (12) and households (27) were 
then employed to explore the individual and collective experiences of these 
adaptation processes. Institutional interviews with town hall officials and 
employees of the service provider (EPM) rounded off these approaches, by 
soliciting the views of the institutional actors. 
 
 
3. Residential services: learning about ‘regular’ urban life while 
juggling with commercial measures 
The services are very important, because no one can live without water, and in any 
case if you let the bills accumulate, you have to pay interest and penalties! It’s only 
now that I realise that it is very important to pay for the services. It was starting to be 
counterproductive, because since we didn’t have individual bills I almost wasn’t 
given an apartment. [. . .] [At the time of rehousing] they [the municipality] stopped 
paying the rent for people who had never paid for their services and had had their 
services cut off, and they were not allocated a home. In any case, we have to pay, 
because if no one pays the company won’t be able to operate anymore and we’ll 
find ourselves without a service provider! [. . .] there are a lot of people who have 
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left here, who have abandoned their apartment and put it up for rent, because they 
didn’t have the means to pay. EPM sent somebody to educate people, because they 
have a lot of problems paying. (Female resident of El Tirol, rehoused from Sinaï, 
interviewed in May 2013) 
 
Service delivery in Ciudadela entails three relative novelties for households: 
connection, along with metered payment; new, less subsidised prices; and a 
bigger range of services included in the residential package. In this part, we 
examine how households adapt their practices to their new living conditions 
through a learning process that supposes their capacity to understand and make 
their service delivery rules. This results in a first type of co-production that relates 
to the bypass of commercial rules, and results in the perpetuation and 
normalisation of ‘specific’ or ‘exceptional’ measures. 
 
3.1. Facing conventional multiservice delivery: a learning process 
Households have experienced different kinds of access to services before 
coming to Ciudadela: from self-built networks to conventional connections, 
including along the way nonconventional systems such as pilas públicas14 or  
‘community  aqueducts’  (Table 1). The move to Ciudadela represented for some 
of them a ‘forced’ shift from informal to conventional access, leading to new 
types of relations with service consumption and with the provider. One former 
inhabitant of the informal district of Vallejuelos, who lives on the Las Flores 
estate (interviewed in April 2013), gave us her account of the change: ‘I wasn’t 
used to paying! It was at an [information] meeting that they told us that here we 
have to respond responsibly, it’s not like where we used to live.’ This means 
learning to manage money differently: 
 
We knew that for the services, we would have to pay, that it’s not like at Oasis. [. . .] I 
have paid the bills with the money I won playing ‘chance’ [lottery] and by selling a 
piece of jewellery. I pay for the services even if I have to go hungry. I keep my money 
for the services, my daughter gives me some to pay for groceries. (Residents of La 
Cascada, a household relocated from El Oasis, Moravia. Interviewed in April 2013) 
 
Furthermore, being billed for actual consumption is also a novelty for half the 
households interviewed (52%). 
 
Table 1. Ciudadela: regularisation and uniformisation of residential connections. 
Connection in 
Type of connection in previous dwelling Ciudadela 
 
  
Informal 
Pila 
pública 
 
Conventional 
Shared 
conventional 
 
None 
  
Conventional 
Electricity 5 6 12 4 0  27 
Water 9 3 11 4 0  27 
Gas 0 0 6 0 21  27 
Telephone 0 0 16 0 11  26 
Internet 0 0 2 0 25  15 
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In Moravia, EPM made us pay a flat fee and not for actual consumption. What we 
were interested in was the average and the flat fee, not our consumption. EPM 
would come and count how many people lived in the house, and charged us on that 
basis. That way, we had no disconnection problems [service suspended for non-
payment]. But here we know that we have to find the money to pay for the services. 
We have to do everything we can, but it’s more difficult because it’s more expensive. 
(Residents of La Huerta, former inhabitants of El Morro, Moravia, Interviewed in 
May 2013) 
 
In addition to this, households have to manage a broadening of the range of 
residential services (provided by a single company and generally combined in a 
single bill, except for telecommunications) and cope with the reduction in 
subsidies, which are based on the socio-economic strata system. This system 
classifies housing into six categories (strata), according to the physical 
characteristics of the building (materials, communal spaces) and the 
neighbourhood (infrastructures and urban amenities). Roughly, as shown in 
Table 2, households living in strata 1 to 3 housing beneficiate from subsidies, 
applied in the form of discounts on the basic prices below the ‘subsistence 
consumption’ threshold defined by the government. In contrast, households living 
in strata 5 and 6 pay a surcharge on the real price for their whole consumption 
that goes into the equalisation funds. 
Because the physical conditions of the accommodation and facilities in 
Ciudadela are better than those in their previous location, 52% of the households 
interviewed undergo a ‘level increase’. While most of the households interviewed 
expressed a wish to keep up-to-date with their bill payments, they also described 
the problems: according to the accounts given, 63% of the households had 
encountered payment difficulties since settling in Ciudadela and had been 
obliged to pay late, to put off other spending or to borrow money, whereas only a 
third had experienced similar difficulties in their previous accommodation. 
This broad spectrum of services and ‘regrading’ contribute to households’ 
greater expenditure, at a time when they have to assume higher costs on 
housing (home loans15 and property taxes), and household revenues and 
benefits are falling (lack of local economic tissue, the need to use transportation 
to find an economic activity). If households claim their willingness to respect 
these new service delivery conditions, this doesn’t happen submissively. As we 
will see it on the following sections, households go through a process of 
individual appropriation of commercial conditions. 
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Table 2. Subsidies for residential services based on socio-economic strata. 
Electricity* Water and sewerage** Gas** 
 
Strata 1 −60% −60% −50% * 
Strata 2 −50% −40% −37% * 
Strata 3 −15% −15% Real price 
Strata 4 Real price Real price Real price 
Strata 5 +20% +50% +20% 
Strata 6 +20% +60% +20% 
Note: Subsidy in the form of a discount on the real price up to a basic consumption threshold of 130 kWh for electricity 
and 20 m3 for water and gas. Consumption above this threshold is billed at the real price. 
+ Contribution, a surcharge on the real price that goes into the equalisation funds that finance the subsidies. 
* No fixed charge. 
** Subsidy set by the municipal councils, can vary from year to year. Water and gas price rates applied by EPM for 
the city of Medellín in February 2015. 
 
 
3.2. From exceptional measures to day-to-day commercial arrangements: 
a first level of co-production 
In order to face these changes and to meet their obligations as clients (i.e. 
paying their bills), households have to understand the rules imposed by the 
EPM. A learning process takes place through experimentation and experience 
transfer between neighbours. This process allows households to balance service 
delivery rules with their own needs and constraints, making some exceptional 
measures become routine, which we claim is a way of co-production. Our 
investigations identified two main categories. 
In the first, households aim to regain their capacity to make their own choices 
and designate their spending priorities, as they (do their best to) continue to 
meet their paying obligations. In a context where connection to all services is 
imposed, households introduce priorities and selective connection/disconnection 
practices. Some choose to cancel service supply contracts or to let the service 
they consider less essential be ‘cut off’, sometimes letting the arrears build up 
until they are disconnected (after two consecutive unpaid bills). This is mainly 
true for telecommunications services and gas, which are seen as low priority. 
In the second, households seek to manage their budget, adopting their own 
paying rhythm, coping with deadlines and other commercial measures. In order 
to meet their needs (groceries, housing, transport, education…) and ensure their 
capacity to pay their bills, households learn to juggle with payment deadlines. 
This allows them to report expenditures from one month to the other, according 
to their priorities. So we find that 41% of the households interviewed build up two 
months of arrears,16 during which they focus on other spending, even if it means 
having to make an additional effort to pay off their debt. Similarly, 41% pay a few 
days late, often when they receive the second monthly wage, with the penalty of 
paying interest on the arrears.17 Some households, however, use non-payment 
to apply for a prepay electricity meter.18 Households see prepay meters as a way 
to control their spending and make their money go further.   These attempts are 
not always successful but, even when they end in a return to informal 
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connection, they reflect an underlying wish to become part of the norm, at least in 
the first instance. 
These juggling acts show that household budgets are under pressure and 
that paying for services gives rise to various tactics for bypassing the commercial 
rules, depending on how they are understood by households. The households in 
Ciudadela therefore demonstrate a gradual and pragmatic adaptation to their 
new living environment, and to the new rules that regulate it. One main 
conclusion can be made so far: co-production is related to a reciprocal learning 
process, by which households acquire knowledge to control and prioritise EPM’s 
service delivery rules. In doing so, they are not directly involved in the delivery of 
the services, but they contribute to creating the conditions for it. 
 
 
4. Learning about co-ownership and communal services in 
condominiums 
The second level we have analysed is the condominium, where co-production 
leads to collective arrangements about the distribution of responsibilities related 
to service delivery in communal areas. When they become owners of their 
apartments, households also become co-owners of a building, something none 
of the households in the sample had previously experienced. Despite the 
information given by the Medellín Housing Institute (ISVIMED) and the family 
welfare funds during the housing allocation procedure, many households were 
not given sufficient information and did not understand their collective 
obligations as co-owners.19 For them, the urban regularisation embodied in the 
move to Ciudadela very quickly led to inflated new obligations and expenditure, 
which included paying the bills for water, sewerage and electricity for the 
communal areas, as well as the building maintenance costs. 
The new residents are therefore required to assume collective responsibilities 
that demand a preliminary understanding of the collective issues and a minimum 
of consensus around shared rules of occupancy and management for communal 
areas and assets. Co-owners are supposed to build an administrative structure 
to cope with these new responsibilities. Certain residents, the so-called ‘building 
leaders’,20 have become dominant in condominium management, while in a few 
buildings, ‘manager teams’ have formed and shared out the roles: budget 
management and payments, resolution of conflicts between neighbours and 
monitoring of compliance with the building rules (convivencia committee) and 
building maintenance (cleaning, repairs, improvements). In some cases, the 
building leaders are compensated, but most work free of charge, except for 
certain activities such as cleaning. With very limited management skills, they are 
the main agents in the construction of collective norms and the primary 
interlocutors with the institutions. Some of them have approached the Comités 
de Desarrollo y de Control Social de los Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (utility 
service users’ associations), which insure a legal and political support to their 
demands. These associations are directly or more discreetly linked to political 
parties, and are main bodies for democratic control over EPM. Service billing for 
communal areas (corridors, stairwells, technical equipment) exposes the building 
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leaders and co-owners to complex situations: refusal to pay collective service 
charges, wire-tapping of the electrical connections in the communal areas and 
meter fiddling. These situations play an essential role in the collective learning of 
condominium management and co-production of service under specific 
conditions of sharing responsibilities between co-owners, EPM and local 
authorities. Below, we describe two situations that illustrate how these tensions 
and the negotiations and adjustments to which they give rise contribute to the co-
production of a more suitable supply of services in collective areas. We will focus 
on two types of situations regularly handled by the utility in traditional (non-
collective housing) districts: tapping and unpaid bills. 
 
4.1. Facing disconnection: social outsourcing or co-responsibility? 
As we saw earlier, households have to assume higher charges once they arrive 
in Ciudadela, leading for some to unpaid bills and service disconnection. 
Whereas informal reconnection is common in the traditional neighbourhoods 
(townhouses; small, self-build apartment buildings) and is considered as part of 
the utility’s ‘commercial losses’, it becomes a sensitive matter in Ciudadela since 
in social housing buildings these fiddles have an impact on collective costs. 
Urban planning standards and the architecture of collective housing provide 
less opportunity for fiddling. For example, the power poles are not near the 
apartments, the water pipes are buried and it would be a considerable feat to 
route a wire or a pipe to the fourth floor illegally without being noticed. The 
solutions are of two types: fiddling the meters (reopening the valve, ‘turning back’ 
the water meter) and direct connection to installations in the communal areas of 
the building. These two solutions have a direct impact on the collective billing, 
since a ‘general meter’ calculates the total amount of services supplied to the 
building, and the consumption from the communal areas is calculated by 
deducting the consumption of individual apartments. When a household ‘turns 
back’ the water meter, for example, their consumption is not measured by their 
individual meter, and is therefore reported as part of the communal areas’ 
consumption. Co-owners have to deal with these temporary or semi-temporary 
fixes put up by households that have been disconnected for non-payment or that 
try to reduce the amount they pay by tapping on communal areas’ connections. 
While there are moralistic responses to reconnections or connections to the 
communal areas, there is also a general awareness of the social difficulties of 
many families. One woman resident of Chagualón explains that ‘there are people 
who previously paid 5000 pesos for a fraud, but now have to pay bills of 80,000 
pesos per month and communal charges. Some of them cannot afford all those 
expenses’ (inhabitant of Chagualón, former resident of Las Margaritas, 
interviewed in March 2013). In the same way that, according to the accounts 
given, EPM shows (temporary) tolerance regarding informal connections in 
certain parts of the city, there are cases where connection to the communal 
areas is tolerated by the co-owners for households in particularly difficult 
circumstances, after a death or in the case of single-parent families. This 
tolerance, always temporary, depends on the building leader’s capacity to arouse 
solidarity between neighbours. It can also be allowed in return for services such 
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as cleaning the building. 
These situations can be understood as a form of social outsourcing, where 
co-owners face a collective action problem to deal locally with disconnections 
and illegal connections while, in other housing contexts, they would be 
considered to be part of EPM’s commercial responsibilities. Co-owners become 
an ‘external manager’ for EPM, controlling and informing on tapping, and 
assuming the financial consequences. 
 
4.2. Negotiating a ‘payment culture’ with or without legal condominium 
associations 
According to a former official at Gerencia de Ciudadela (interviewed in January 
2012), 80% of conflicts between neighbours are associated with the payment of 
electricity, water and sewage bills for the communal areas. In some buildings, 
unpaid communal bills summed up quite high, as is the case with one building in 
La Cascada where the debt for water bills reached 13 million pesos (leaders’ 
meeting, January 2013). Co-owners’ resistance to pay collective bills is based on 
a mix of mistrust and misunderstanding, as is illustrated by this leader comment: 
There are people who say that they are not going to pay the communal service 
charge, because in any case if they lose [the apartment] it doesn’t matter, since 
in any case it didn’t belong to them before, and they can move back into a 
shack. (Building leader, La Cascada, interviewed in April 2013) 
In response, the building leaders develop different strategies aiming to 
promote what they call a ‘payment culture’: displaying the name of the non-
paying household and the amount owed at the entrance to the building, cutting 
off the electricity or water service to the whole building to put collective pressure 
on bad payers, exclusion of households from activities such as Christmas parties 
or building improvements, etc. These social control tactics are partly inspired by 
the spread of examples from middle-class and wealthy buildings, which the 
building leaders have access to not only via their personal or professional 
networks, but also by EPM’s commercial practices. 
While co-owners struggle to recover unpaid contributions for collective bills, 
contributions for collective bills, leaders, EPM and ISVIMED agreed after long 
discussions to “individualise” them, meaning that EPM includes into the individual 
bill for an apartment a part of the collective bill corresponding to the consumption 
in the communal areas.21 There are, however, two prerequisites for the adoption 
of this system: the negotiation of the debt with EPM and the creation of a legal 
condominium association. Such an association is needed for legal pathways to 
be employed in the event of disputes among co-owners as well as between co-
owners and other entities, such as builders or service providers, but not all co-
owners agree to create the legal figure. 
Individualisation provides a certain degree of ‘comfort’ for the building leaders 
and offers a guarantee of collection for EPM, since the households cannot 
separate the two bills. Nonetheless, not all the building leaders and residents 
agree on this. Some express a certain mistrust of the billing mechanisms and 
believe that individualisation limits their collective capacity to monitor 
consumption and the amounts billed. They explain that it is only when they 
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receive bills for the communal areas that they can identify any variation in 
consumption, which may be explained by an informal connection in the corridors 
or other problems. When the amount billed is divided by 80 apartments, this 
usually represents slightly under 1000 pesos, an amount that is usually invisible 
to households, particularly because of fluctuations in service tariffs. 
It is therefore largely through informal exchanges between the building 
leaders that learning takes place, that ‘good practices’ circulate, that problems 
and their solutions are discussed and management skills gradually developed. 
During discussions between the building leaders, sometimes very heated 
debates take shape around subjects such as the payment of utility bills or the 
assignment of responsibility for maintenance work.  One of the issues that came 
up several times in the interviews is the following: ‘given that they are the ones 
[the municipality, ISVIMED] who put us here and in this situation, why should it 
be up to us to deal with all this?’ By ‘all this’, the leaders      mean the 
maintenance of the buildings, the work needed to tackle their rapid deterioration, 
informal connections by households who cannot or will not pay for services, etc. 
Through these discussions, the residents question the assignment of 
responsibilities in urban management, challenge the legitimacy of each 
stakeholder role and assess their own share of work, calling on the local 
institutions when the task is beyond their control. The latter, in their turn, try to 
promote the autonomy of the inhabitants, which begins with the legal 
establishment of condominium associations. For example, in response to the 
deterioration of the stairways and corridor railings in a building that     had been 
occupied for a little over six months at the time of our interview, one leader 
exclaimed: ‘as long as we have no legal status [for the condominium] they won’t 
do anything!’ (leader of El Tirol, interviewed in April 2013). In March 2013, 
ISVIMED organised a one-day meeting to promote the creation of condominium 
associations in all the social housing buildings. The results were mixed: some 
buildings reached agreements with ISVIMED about repairs and agreed on the 
payment of their debts     with EPM but others expressed ‘resistance’. 
 
5. Service delivery in social condominiums: an emerging framework 
resulting from collective learning 
While households and co-owners gradually adapt to their new environment, the 
utility also adapts its professional routines and practices to the conditions of its 
activities in the social housing districts. At this level, however, service delivery is 
also affected by technical and political choices made by actors beyond EPM and 
households, and who include constructors, local authorities, the housing institute 
and civic movements. All of them play an essential role in stabilising the 
emergent arrangements and therefore contribute to the co-production of services 
by strengthening the utility’s capacity to extend and adapt its delivery model 
while enhancing the quality of services. We will review how these other actors 
contribute to service co-production at the household and condominium levels. 
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5.1. Towards transitional arrangements? 
In their efforts to adapt, households interact in different ways with the utility as 
well as other institutional players: both dialogue and conflict promote a mutual 
recognition, and in certain cases lead to shared innovations and reciprocal 
adaptations. As said earlier, households arriving in Ciudadela then face a 
reduction in the tariff subsidies, which are calculated according to the socio-
economic strata system. This system is based on a national methodology and 
set of criteria that determine the buildings’ classification and directly impact the 
bills that households have to pay for their service consumptions. This issue was 
a subject of discussion and negotiation at the time of the rehousing of the former 
residents of two informal settlements: Moravia and La Iguaná. In order to reach 
an agreement on the rehousing, the municipality agreed on an exceptional 
measure on the socio-economic strata methodology. According to this 
agreement, Moravia and La Iguaná former dwellers beneficiate of a level 1 strata 
for 10 years (Decreto n°2586 of 2013), although they live in buildings that are 
classified as strata 2 or 3. In this case, negotiations between local leaders and 
the municipality bypassed service delivery regulations, granting a special status 
to a group of households because of their residential past. This temporary 
measure smoothens the cost of households’ adaptation to their new living 
conditions while at the same time reducing the risk of non-payment. We suggest 
that this example emphasises a case of co-production where users were able, 
through resistance and negotiations, to involve the local political authorities 
alongside the utility in order to deliver affordable services. 
 
5.2. From treating to preventing problems in condominiums’ collective 
services 
What both co-owners and EPM have learnt in co-producing services, particularly 
in the communal areas of social condominiums, and the resulting arrangements 
have had real impacts on new housing projects. Increased coordination between 
the constructors, the housing institute or the family service funds (that are legally 
responsible for the buildings until the co-owners’ association is created) and 
EPM has also been institutionalised. 
Rising debts, residents’ refusals to pay and also the involvement of political 
actors and consumer rights organisations have led to the opening of a dialogue 
between ISVIMED, EPM and the Municipality. The inhabitants’ difficulties in 
adopting the legal framework for condominium management (Act 765 of 2001) 
made legal avenues difficult: in the absence of official condominium 
associations, many buildings have remained under the responsibility of 
ISVIMED, the legal holder of utility bills and unpaid bills, which in the case of 
water amounted to around €100,000 in 2013 (265 million pesos). In response, in 
2012, ISVIMED launched the Vecinos y amigos programme to encourage the 
creation of condominium associations and provide them educational material on 
their rights and duties. Moreover, to convince the residents, ISVIMED also 
agreed that, once a condominium association was set up, the building’s water 
bills would be definitively settled and the maintenance and repair works 
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completed. According to the accounts of the building leaders and the vocales de 
control,22 it was the pressure from EPM, in response to the unsustainable 
increase in debt, that led to the opening of a stable and serious dialogue 
between all the stakeholders. 
This has resulted in concrete arrangements. Thus, apartment buildings 
constructed after 2013 are delivered with an ‘individualised’ billing system, which 
includes consumption for the communal areas in the individual household bills. In 
order to reduce the part of collective consumptions, electricity installations in 
communal areas have also been redesigned in some of the new buildings. For 
example, those in El Tirol were designed so that the corridor lighting is controlled 
from inside the apartments: a bulb is located opposite the entrance door of each 
apartment with a switch inside the home. Each household chooses to illuminate 
or not the corridor, reducing part of the collective billing but reinforcing 
individuality in the buildings’ day-to-day management. Arrangements have also 
been made in order to protect meters from tapping. 
None of these new arrangements is perfect and most have side effects, but 
the difficulties encountered in the years following the delivery of the first social 
housing buildings have served as a learning experience for adapting the 
conditions of service supply to the socio-economic realities of their occupants. 
They also highlight the long-standing ability of EPM to successfully meet and 
accompany urban change: with the Habilitación Viviendas programme in the 
early 1960s, the Pilas Públicas system in the 1980s and the prepay meters from 
2007. What seems to be new in Ciudadela, compared to the company’s 
responsiveness and capacity for innovation demonstrated in earlier experiences, 
is the co-production of services in which both the users and the utility agree to 
get involved in the name of a common vision or at least one shared ‘desire’ of 
urban modernity. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The process of urban modernisation in Medellín has given rise to numerous 
analyses of the physical transformations to the city (Blanco and Kobayashi 2009; 
Brand 2013; Dávila 2012; Echeverri Restrepo and Orsini 2012; Martin and 
Corrales 2009; Quinchía-Roldán 2013), but the living conditions of inhabitants 
rehoused into the new social housing districts and their interactions with the 
municipal utility are less well known. Our case study of Ciudadela Nuevo 
Occidente highlights both the challenges of a reciprocal ‘domestication’ and the 
extent of informal cooperation between the residents and EPM. We suggest that 
the resulting arrangements are a form of co-production of services supported by 
a dynamic of formalisation of citizenship and of regularisation  of access to 
networks. 
As stressed by Verschuere, Brandsen, and Pestoff (2012), there is still 
‘conceptual confusion’ in studies that refer to co-production and more empirical 
evidence is needed. By focusing on everyday practice and experience of service 
delivery, we highlight and discuss in this case study three important aspects of 
collective action which, in our opinion, contribute to add texture to our 
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understanding of co-producing services. 
First, we find that residential services involve constant negotiations and 
contestation (about payment of the bill, delays, temporary informal connections, 
arrears, etc.) that contribute to shaping the service delivery configuration in 
social housing. Second, we emphasise that enforcing collective binding 
decisions on condominium inhabitants is not the exclusive capacity of a formal 
body like EPM but also rests in the hand of neighbours and building leaders who, 
together with the utilities’ professionals and other local actors, help lay the 
foundation for ownership of services by residents. Third, the ordinary experience 
of service delivery in Ciudadela shows that cooperative arrangements between 
the inhabitants and the utility are temporary and that their aim is less the 
transformation than the regulation of service delivery configurations in social 
condominiums. Co-production is thus a key process through which ordinary 
citizens encounter the utility and progressively learn to negotiate their role and 
responsibilities in the service relationship.  
As a process accompanying urban modernisation, co-production of services 
is therefore a framework to master and negotiate the pace of change and to 
share adaptation efforts. As such, it is more important for what it makes possible 
(formalisation of citizenship and regularisation of access to networks) than for 
what it is in itself (a mechanism of co-management, not intended to be lasting). 
However, since co-production is still often resisted by regular providers, public 
and private, the ability to interact with users in alternative ways has in itself a 
significant potential of institutional innovation. Finally, as shown by the detailed 
arrangements negotiated in Ciudadela, co-producing services also has an 
operational efficacity, the political implications of which should not be 
underestimated, since the incorporation of populations from informal 
neighbourhoods into the formal city is key to municipal projects of urban 
modernisation. 
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Notes 
1. The names given to the municipal programmes since the end of the 1990s illustrate this vision: 
« Por una ciudad más humana » [For a more humane city] (Juan Gómez Martínez, 1998- 
2000), « Medellín Competitiva » (Luís Pérez, 2001-2003), « Medellín: Compromiso de toda la 
ciudadanía » [Medellin: The involvement of all citizens] (Sergio Fajardo, 2004-2007), « 
Medellín es Solidaria y Competitiva » [Medellín is community minded and competitive] (Alonso 
Salazar, 2008-2011), « Medellín un hogar para la vida » [Medellín, a home for life] (Anibal 
Gaviria, 2012-2015). 
2. The city’s transformation has been celebrated through different international events since 2005. 
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It has hosted events such as the World Urban Forum (2014), the South American Olympic 
Games (2010) and the OAS 38th General Assembly (2008). The city has also earned various 
international awards such as the Innovative City of the Year (2013), the International 
Sustainable Transport Award (2012), UN-Habitat Scroll of Honour Award (2010), Dubai 
International Award for Best Practices (2008), etc. 
3. The Strategic Housing Plan assessment (PEHMED 2020) estimates the shortage of dwellings 
at 19% and equality deficit at 10%. This plan provided for the building of 1 million new dwellings 
between 2005 and 2009, to offset the rise in the shortage. (Alcaldía de Medellín, Instituto Social 
de Vivienda y Hábitat de Medellín -ISVIMED, Universidad Nacional – Escuela del Hábitat -
CEHAP, & Corporación Viva la Ciudadanía, 2011, p. 113). 
4. According to Medellín municipality, there were around 46,000 inhabitants in 2014. 
(http://www.metrosalud.gov.co/inter/joomla/index.php/noticias/675-alcaldia-de-medellin-
entrego-la-primera-fase-de-la-unidad-hospitalaria-nuevo-occidente, accessed 27 March 
2015). 
5. The city’s housing policy, which has a target of building 15,000 dwellings per year, has been 
reinforced since 2012 by the national ‘100,000 free homes’ policy, which has resulted in the 
building of 8489 new homes in Medellín, 30% of them in Ciudadela Nuevo Occidente 
(http://www.minvivienda.gov.co/sala-de-prensa/noticias/2014/junio/el-ministerio-de-vivienda-ya-
termin%C3%B3-el-81-de-las-viviendas-gratis-a-entregar-en-cundinamarca, accessed 27 March 
2015). 
6. According to public data from the Housing Institute (ISVIMED), 2010 apartments divided into five 
blocks were under construction in October 2014. (http://www.isvimed.gov.co/evolucion-de-
proyectos-en-construccion, accessed 27 March 2015) 
7. The communal areas of the buildings consist of the entrance halls, stairways, shared corridors 
and service premises, which contain the water tanks and pumps for pumping water to the top 
floors. 
8. In order to face this, the municipality created a structure called Gerencia de Pajarito (Pajarito’s 
management unit), whose main roles are to coordinate institutional action within this area and 
to offer a local assistance to Ciudadela’s dwellers on administrative procedures, in order to 
reduce their need to travel to downtown. However, this structure has not worked on a 
continuous way, since it is highly dependent on an unstable political will: it has been closed for 
long periods and the team’s turnover is high. 
9. There is a lack of statistical data on Ciudadela Nuevo Occidente. The ‘quality of life’ surveys 
conducted every year by Medellín Municipality include Ciudadela in the San Cristobal 
corregimiento (rural locality), making it difficult to isolate specific data for the district. In addition, 
since housing construction is still in progress, it is difficult to make estimates based on data for 
the San Cristobal sector. 
10. High-risk zones are those vulnerable to geophysical threats because of their proximity to 
watercourses (flood risk) or unstable soil (risk of landslides). There exist different levels    of 
risk, defined in terms of the technical and economic possibility of  carrying  out mitigation and 
prevention work. (For more information, see the thesis written by López Peláez 2008.) 
11. Not exceeding the two minimum salaries, i.e. 1,232,000 pesos, around €450. 
12. Fieldwork was carried out by C. Duque-Gómez as part of a thesis on urban planning. It took 
place in the course of two stays between December 2011 and June 2013. Thirty-nine inter- 
views were conducted with the inhabitants of Ciudadela Nuevo Occidente and 11 with 
institutional, local associations and economic actors. 
13. The months that preceded the first fieldwork in Ciudadela (fin 2011) were marked by the 
resurgence of violence between armed groups competing for the control of this territory. For 
reasons of safety, ‘building leaders’ were approached to facilitate interviews with the house- 
holds. While the public order situation grew calmer in 2012, this approach based on 
intermediaries was maintained, in particular because of people’s mistrust of outsiders. This has 
methodological implications and limits the representativeness of the sample. In addition, the 
absence of official data on the populations of Ciudadela meant that the individual situations of 
households were assessed on a more empirical than statistical basis. 
14. Pilas públicas are group connections whereby the supplier bills households a flat fee, based on 
the average consumed by the same category of users. This technical system was adopted by 
EPM in the 1980s to provide electricity supply in areas where urban development was 
impossible (informal settlements, unstable ground) and where Habilitación Viviendas – the main 
service expansion policy – could not be applied. 
15. The monthly amount paid by households for their apartment varies depending on the 
household’s profile and the reasons of their arrival in Ciudadela: rehousing, beneficiaries of 
social national and local programmes or family service funds. We encountered difficulties to 
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gather reliable information on households’ revenues through our interviews, making it difficult to 
develop a thorough analysis on their financial situation and the impact of housing expenses. 
However, according to the interviews, we can see that, for those who go through family service 
funds and some beneficiaries of social housing programmes (not rehoused or displaced by 
armed conflict), the expenses represent in average 30% of their revenues, which vary from 
80,000 pesos to 3,000,000 pesos per month (the legal minimum wage in 2013 was 589,500 
pesos (306 US$). The exact amount of their monthly contribution depends on their start-up 
capital contribution. 
16. There is a deadline for paying bills without incurring a charge, but the supply is only cut off after 
the second month without payment. 
17. In Colombia, monthly wages are paid in two goes, ‘per fortnight’. Households often spread out 
their main spending by, for example, allocating one ‘fortnight’ to rent and major shopping, and 
the other to bills and school fees. The households point out that one big difficulty in paying bills 
is that the deadline often falls between the 26th and 28th of the month, whereas wages are paid 
on the 1st or 15th of each month. 
18. Prepay meters have been adopted by EPM in 2007 as a method of reconnecting households in 
default. One of the conditions required to apply for the meter is to have arrears on four 
consecutive bills. 
19. According to the law (Act 675 of 2001), co-owners are legally responsible of condominium 
management. Local authorities (ISVIMED) and housing project developers withdraw from daily 
management once 51% of the apartments are assigned. 
20. Their profiles vary from historically engaged persons that used to be active in their former 
neighbourhoods (through political parties, religious groups or other types of associations) to 
‘newcomers’ that become active because they are concerned for their patrimony as owners or 
those who see on their engagement an opportunity to have a future income linked to the 
management activities. Until 2013, leaders were self-proclaimed or designated by co-owners on 
an informal basis, but since March 2013 co-owners have to create a legal syndicate, whose 
members are elected on the annual assemblies. 
21. Broadly speaking, in a building with 40 apartments where the communal areas consume    120 
kWh of electricity, households are billed 3 kWh at the rate applicable to the communal areas 
(full price, unsubsidised), in addition to their monthly consumption. The amount equivalent to 
these 3 kWh is included into the sum to pay and may under no circumstances be paid 
separately. 
22. Representatives of the Comités de Desarrollo y de Control Social de los Servicios Públicos 
Domiciliarios, the main bodies for democratic control over the operation and quality of service of 
service supply companies. 
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